Conflict between the upstream and downstream residents of four major river basins in Korea has recently intensified. The introduction of a metric-based surcharge for piped water, coupled with environmental regulations, aims to resolve these conflicts. The water surcharge system was introduced both to collect revenue via a levy and to achieve a win-win situation for both upstream and downstream users through two major policy measures: increasing infrastructure investment in wastewater treatment and providing subsidies to upstream residents to compensate for the losses imposed by environmental regulations. A volumetric surcharge is in line with taxation policy as ordinary households are relatively price inelastic. However, the surcharge is an earmarked water consumption tariff for piped water in order to raise revenue, rather than a full-cost based pollution preventive measure. The remaining tasks include the comprehensive reform of the pricing system to promote equity, efficiency and sustainability of water use.
Introduction
Water resources in river basins have traditionally been regarded as a common good.
However, market failure, combined with a failure of governance, often leads to water-related problems. The nature of water as a common resource tends to result in the excessive depletion/production and consumption of the resource, as well as social costs in terms of pollution. These problems are compounded by a failure of governance. For example, institutional failure, such as poorly established environmental law and a coordination failure between central and local governments about water pollution problems can exacerbate social conflicts.
In order to achieve efficient river basin management we need to consider two different types of users of river flows. One group is consumers such as households, industry and farmers who deplete the water from rivers through their use of the public water supply (this group is often located in the downstream of rivers). The other group is polluters, including industry, livestock and households, which are often located upstream. These two groups of river consumers are in conflict, although both create social costs. Market failure to allocate the common resource (water) efficiently is the main problem for the upstream river users.
These users want to use (i.e. discharge pollutants into) water with a view to maximising their individual welfare or corporate profit, without considering the negative impact on the environment. On the other hand, the downstream users want to enjoy clean water without considering the depletion of this scarce resource and the consequent social costs.
An efficient river basin management system needs to consider both of these forms of social cost. There are two options for preventing upstream pollution. One is a command and control (C&C) type of regulatory policy and the other is a market-based system. Prohibition of business activities and the discharge of pollutants are examples of the C&C approach.
Market-based measures include a Pigouvian-type tariff system and Coasian-type market creation
1 . The Pigouvian model implies internalisation by placing a tariff on water, whereas the Coasian school recommends the creation of property rights over common resources as well as a market for their transfer, in order to resolve conflicts among competing users (Coase 1960) . Institutional economists are also concerned to minimise transaction costs and advocate reforms in governance in areas such as water law, policy environment and management (Picciotto 1995; North 1990) .
A charge/tariff on publicly supplied water is regarded as the main measure for reducing the social costs incurred by downstream river users 2 . Such a tariff system can be divided into a fixed charge, a variable charge and a hybrid-type non-linear charge. Under a fixed charge system, consumers pay a fixed amount regardless of the quantity of water they consume. Such a scheme is simple, but it cannot control the inefficient use of water. Under a variable charge system, consumers pay a tariff based on their rate of consumption. This may promote the efficient use of water, but fluctuations in revenue may damage the security of the public water supply. Non-linear pricing measures include two-part tariff and increasing block tariff (IBT) schemes. A two-part tariff scheme is a combination of a fixed charge (i.e. an access fee) and a consumption-based variable charge (i.e. a usage payment) (Oi 1971; Cassou & House, 1999) . IBT is a modified two-part tariff as it breaks down the variable component further, so that one price is charged for the first block of water, the unit price increases to the next level for the next block and so on. These non-linear pricing systems are considered more advanced than the previous two approaches as they promote the efficient use of water as well as creating a stable source of revenue if administrative costs are not high.
South Korea (hereafter Korea) has traditionally considered water to be an unlimited natural resource. A wasteful person is described as "spending money like water". Therefore, in a similar vein to the riparian doctrine, there was little social concern about the allocation and management of national water resources. However, the perception of water has changed significantly recently as water-related conflicts have intensified. The main objective of this paper is to investigate changes in the management of four major river basins in Korea. The paper is particularly concerned with an assessment of the surcharge for piped water to domestic users that was introduced as part of the Comprehensive Countermeasures for Improving Water Quality in Four Major Rivers that were announced in 2002 (Ministry of Planning and Budget, 2002a) . Korea has begun to introduce a surcharge for piped water since 1999 when the government announced the Han River Special Law to improve the quality of water in the river. The unique features of these surcharges are that they are levied on end users and they are earmarked tariffs.
The following section outlines the nature of the problem in terms of supply and demand and the maintenance of quality. Section 3 discusses three major water price reforms and Section 4 presents an assessment of the reforms and outlines the remaining issues relating to price reform. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
The problem

Supply-side issues
Korea has to deal with the problem of decreasing water availability per capita 3 and this is an issue that has concerned civil engineers in Korea (Shim et al., 2002 and referen therein) . The total annual runoff in river basins and damming of the rivers have been the main concerns in ensuring both the supply of fresh water and flood prevention.
ces Table 1 shows that water availability per capita is expected to decrease sharply by 2021. This is mainly attributable to population increase, given the marginal flexibility of supply. Total water supply in 1993 included supply from river flows (53%), reservoirs/dams capita in Korea increased marginally from 7.0 to 7.1 metric tonnes/capita between 1993 and
2001, but will then decline continuously, to 6.4 metric tonnes/capita by 2021. Meanwhile, the population is projected to grow from 44.2 million in 1993 to 52.4 million in 2021.
Historically, the concept of supply-side policy began from an understanding of water in terms of "shortage", implying that access to a given quantity of water was a basic human requirement (Hoekstra, 1998 and expanding industrial activity, will continue to put pressure on the water supply in Korea,
given the virtually fixed supply capacity of water. The water supply capacity is projected to grow by 8.7% per annum, with total demand growing by 27.6% over the same period. The ratio of annual water withdrawal to annual water resources in Korea was around 45% in the early 1990s (OECD, 1994) . A study commissioned by the UN Commission on Sustainable Development defined water scarcity in terms of the total amount of annual withdrawal as a percentage of annual water resources. This criterion identifies a water scarce country as one in which annual withdrawal exceeds 40% of annual water resources.
According to this criterion, Korea has had a water scarcity problem since the early 1990s. Figure 1 shows the trends in water contamination, measured by biological oxygen demand (BOD), which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume in breaking down waste, in the four major river basins between 1990 and 2001. Overall, the data confirm that none of the four river basins meets the conditions for potable water supply Class 1, which requires a level of 1 BOD or less. Water quality in the upstream was better than it was downstream, where it has deteriorated particularly since 1998. Water in the upstream, except in the Nakdong River, approached potable supply Class 1 by the end of 2001.
Water contamination
Conflict and reform
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However, levels of BOD in the downstream ranged between 3-4 (Han River), 3-7 (Nakdong River), 2.5-5 (Kum River) and 4-7 (Yong San River). 
Water charges
Korea has announced three important water pricing policy reforms in order to resolve such conflicts and improve water quality along the four major river basins. The first was the Comprehensive Water Management Countermeasures policy of 1996. The 1996 countermeasures were introduced in preparation for Korea to join the OECD. While this policy did not directly target the four major river basins, it encouraged the improvement of economic instruments to prevent and/or resolve conflicts over water. As a result, 59 of 167 local governments abandoned minimum fixed charge schemes and re-introduced volumebased water charges. In particular, the basis for access fees has changed from a fixed amount to one based on the size of the water pipe 6 .
The second reform was the Han River Special Law of 1999. A volume-based water charge system for publicly supplied water along the Han River Basin was introduced in that year. The surcharge rate has remained at 110 won per tonne since its introduction. Surcharges for piped water were levied on residents in the downstream section of the river such as Seoul, whole regions of Incheon City and 22 municipalities in Kyung Ki Province. As a result, the unit water price increased from 260 won/tonne to 370 won/tonne and payments for water consumption by an average four-person family have increased by 42.3%, from 6,168
won/month to 8,775won/month (Table 4) The law also requires the designation of special monitoring areas in the upstream region to prevent pollution from business activities. It prohibits the construction of a restaurant, hotel, motel, public bath facility, factory or cattle shed within a range of between 300 m and 1km from the upstream river flows. Farming with pesticides and fertilisers is also prohibited. In particular, in order to prevent pollution from non-point polluters, the law requires the compulsory establishment of a "green belt area", which includes the establishment of artificial damp, grassland and a green track of land when new development projects are planned in the Nakdong River region. The Nakdong River Special Law also requires the installation of infrastructure for a "buffer zone" to contain industrial wastewater from the Daekoo industrial complex until the level of water quality in the downstream improves.
Assessment and remaining issues
Conflict resolution
The case of water charges in Korea indicates the possibility of a cooperative solution to the conflict between upstream and downstream residents. The central government played a key role in resolving the conflict, aiming to both strengthen environmental regulations and provide a cross-subsidy for affected residents. Funds generated by the charges to domestic consumers along the river basins are intended to be used for "income compensation" for upstream residents who have suffered financial losses because of the environmental regulations. Around 25% (129.8 won) of the funds generated will be allocated for this purpose.
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The level of the water charge was determined by a special committee, but it is the responsibility of local (municipal) governments to collect the charge from households In addition, in response to complaints from residents in the upstream region, the law allows the mayors of metropolitan cities and the governors of provinces to modify the required level of water quality determined by the Ministry of Environment.
Improving water quality
The nature of the charge for piped water is fundamentally an earmarked consumption tariff rather than a Pigouvian instrument. The government specifically aimed to raise revenue for environmental infrastructure investment and to provide a cross-subsidy. The revenue from the water charges for the four major rivers including the Han River is expected to be around 530 won (US$1  1,200 won). These funds will be allocated to improve the quality of water in the river basins. The government plans to raise the quality of water in the four major river basins including the Han River to potable supply Class 1 or Class 2 in the upstream areas by 2005 (see Table 5 ). The total expected cost of this project is around 530 won The target levels of water quality are determined in advance and the upper limits of the discharge load (amount of pollutant x density of pollution) are set accordingly. In particular, the proposed introduction of environmental regulations based on the total amount of pollutant emission is expected to improve water quality.
Both excess production and consumption cause environmental problems. These problems occur when the marginal social costs incurred by private activities are not included in the agent's cost formula. In other words, individual agents simply ignore the impact of their activities on others and/or society. The discharge of wastewater into the river by upstream residents is one example. The environmental damage caused by damming and pumping aquifers is also still largely unknown and the excess use of water can create salinity problems.
One of the controversial issues in this case is that it focused more on the "treatment" of pollution than on "prevention". Investment in sewerage treatment facilities is for the treatment of wastewater. The imposition of direct charges on polluters may lead them to exploit and/or develop technology to alleviate the problem. implies that the allocation of rights to either polluter or pollutee has no effect on market outcomes, given zero transaction costs. Thus, the allocation of property rights and ownership of water usage rights are subject to culturally based legal institutions. The application of economic instruments is expected to bring a reduction in the emission of pollutants and promote research and development (R&D) investment in environmental technology.
3 Water conservation and volumetric charges
The rapid increase in demand for water, given its limited supply capacity, implies the importance of demand management policies. In the past, the absence of proper instruments for managing demand has resulted in poor water conservation Won (Yong SanSum Jin), to a range from 390 Won (Nakdong River) to 443 Won (Yong SanSum Jin Rivers). As a result, the larger consumers are expected to face a higher financial burden. The data in Table 6 indicate that the effectiveness of water pricing policies on water conservation in urban areas ranged between 16.9 and 29%, depending on the specific conservation measures taken.
However, a pricing policy that targets domestic users needs to be accompanied by more comprehensive policy measures to promote water conservation. The current surcharges only relate to piped water, whereas agriculture is the sector with the highest demand for water, implying that most water conservation projects should focus on irrigation systems. In order to promote efficient water transfer between sectors, a comprehensive water management system is required. The objectives of river management therefore need to be geared to resolving problems arising from water scarcity and conflicts that arise between competing users.
More importantly, the surcharges are uniformly levied on end users instead of having an increasing block structure 9 . Consequently, they cause a social equity problem because the relatively poor groups tend to have proportionately higher tariff burden than the richer groups under a uniform surcharge scheme.
4 Full cost recovery
The concept of full cost recovery is important, particularly for privatising water- (Dinar & Subramanian, 1998) . This is equivalent to around 565 won/ton at the end of 2001, indicating that the water tariff in Korea is still heavily undervalued 11 . For example, the water price in the Nakdong River is 390won/ton, or 69% of the USA water price and less than 7% of production costs in the Middle East region.
Attracting private capital and reforming water utilities is a difficult task. Slow asset turnover that requires long-term debt finance is yet another barrier to private participation.
Putting a tariff on water is politically sensitive and competition (and therefore productivity) could be limited. Full cost recovery-based water pricing is a first step towards encouraging private capital and company participation.
5 The market for water transfer
market for water transfer. This instrument provides for both efficient resource allocation and pollution prevention. First, a voluntary contract between competing users reduces conflict and leads to the efficient allocation of resources. The demand for water by agriculture in Korea is around 53% of total demand. This figure is relatively small compared to other countries such as China (around 70-80%). The declining rate of water use by agriculture in Korea implies that the transfer of water from supporting rice farming to domestic users and to industry will be required in the future. This expectation is based on the theory of the price elasticity of demand. Agriculture is water intensive and thus by definition highly price-elastic compared to, for example, drinking water. Empirical studies show that the price elasticity for irrigated agriculture ranged from -1.0 to -3.0 (Herrington, 1987) , whereas the long-run elasticity of residential water demand in the USA ranged from -0.3 to -0.7 (Shneider & Whitlach, 1991 ).
The Coasian model indicates that the market mechanism can also be employed to cope with water crises. The Coasian approach can be applied from different perspectives. One is through the creation of ownership for water use and the other is through pollution rights.
These rights are exchangeable in the market. The Coasian option is expected to facilitate the development of environmental technology, as technology holders will be able to sell their pollution rights in the market. In a similar vein, the exchange of rights for water use is expected to promote the efficient allocation of water resources among competing sectors. It is also a prerequisite for the encouragement of private capital participation in diverting river flows. Such exchanges in the marketplace may be the long-term solution to water problems if Korea can surmount existing problems, such as comprehensive reforms, to introduce this Coasian exchange concept, in terms of both legal institutions and organisational framework.
Furthermore, these market-based approaches to resolving water conflicts presume cases of pure large scale markets. Compared to the case in the USA, Korea has a lack of pure large scale markets, which may constrain the introduction of policy opening markets for allocation of whole rivers.
Conclusions
In order to resolve growing conflicts over water, the Water surcharges are thus used to raise revenue. The second goal of the policy is to provide subsidies to residents in the upstream areas in order to compensate them for economic losses incurred because of strengthened environmental regulations.
The water surcharge is an earmarked tariff, which is levied on all households along the rivers, except in the case of the Han River where the charge only applies to residents in the downstream. This levy on the price-inelastic household sector is justifiable for tariff purposes.
Households have also been the major source of wastewater. However, the nature of the water charge in the nexus of environmental protection is unclear. This water charge is similar to a consumption tax, as the levy is imposed on both upstream and downstream residents. While a large portion of the earmarked tariff is used to improve water quality, the purpose of the surcharge per se is different from the full-cost-based Pigouvian concept.
The effects of this price reform on resolving conflict through improving the quality of
water have yet to be determined. Both domestic and international experience indicate that a policy that targets ex post "treatment" of pollution has limitations in curbing the emission of pollutants. The introduction of the full-cost based Pigouvian instrument and/or the creation of a market for pollution rights would motivate polluters to "prevent" pollution. The introduction for the surcharge, could also be expected to improve water equity for poorer households.
Furthermore, an integrated water resource pricing system that includes groundwater extraction charges is an issue still to be investigated.
